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malicious attacks: a resilient set-theoretic control approach
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Abstract
In this paper a novel set-theoretic control framework for Networked Constrained Cyber-Physical Systems is
presented. By resorting to set-theoretic ideas and the physical watermarking concept, an anomaly detector module
and a control remediation strategy are formally derived with the aim to contrast severe cyber attacks affecting
the communication channels. The resulting scheme ensures Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness and constraints
fulfillment regardless of any admissible attack scenario. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed
strategy both against Denial of Service and False Data Injection attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) represent the integration of computation, networking, and physical
processes that are expected to play a major role in the design and development of future engineering
systems equipped with improved capabilities ranging from autonomy to reliability and cyber security, see
[15] and references therein. The use of communication infrastructures and heterogeneous IT components
have certainly improved scalability and functionality features in several applications (transportation
systems, medical technologies, water distributions, smart grids and so on), but on the other hand they
have made such systems highly vulnerable to cyber threats, see e.g. the attack on the network power
transmission [8] or the Stuxnet warm which infects the Supervision Control and Data Acquisition
system used to regulate uranium enrichments [5]. Recently, the analysis of the CPS security from a
theoretic perspective has received increasing attention and different solutions to discover cyber attack
occurrences have been proposed, see [11], [12], [14], [18] and reference therein for detailed discussions.
First, it is important to underline that if the attacker and defender share the same information then a
passive anomaly detection system has no chance to identify stealthy attacks [18]. There, the authors
propose the introduction of an artificial time-varying model correlated to the CPS dynamics so that any
adversary attempting to manipulate the system state is revealed through its effect on such an extraneous
time-varying system.
Along these lines, a relevant approach is provided in [12] where the physical watermarking concept is
exploited. Specifically, a noisy control signal is superimposed to a given optimal control input in order
to authenticate the physical dynamics of the system. In [16], the authors modify the system structure
in order to reveal zero dynamic attacks, while in [11] a coding sensor outputs is considered to detect
FDI attacks. It is worth to point out that most of works addressing CPSs focus their attention only on
the detection problem leaving out the control countermeasures. To the best of the author’s knowledge
very few control remediation strategies against cyber attacks have been proposed, see e.g. [6] where a
first contribution for dealing with CPS affected by corrupted sensors and actuators has been presented.
In this paper two classes of cyber attacks will be analyzed: i) partial model knowledge attacks and
ii) full model knowledge attacks [17]. The former is capable to break encryption algorithms which
protect the communication channels and to modify the signals sent to the actuators and to the controller
with the aim to cause physical damages. The second class can inject malicious data within the control
architecture. Zero-dynamics and FDI attacks fall into such a category [17].
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In the sequel, the main aim is to develop a control architecture capable to manage constrained CPSs
subject to malicious data attacks. As one of its main merits, the strategy is able to combine into a unique
framework detection/mitigation tasks with control purposes. In fact both the detection and control phases
are addressed by using the watermarking approach and the set-theoretic paradigm firstly introduced in
[2] and then successfully applied in e.g. [4], [1], [7].
Specifically, the identification module can be viewed as an active detector that, differently from the
existing solutions, does not require neither input or model manipulations. Moreover, a watermarking
like behavior can be simply obtained during the on-line computation of the control action. The attack
mitigation is achieved by exploiting the concept of one-step controllable set jointly with cyber actions
(communication disconnection, channels re-encryption) in order to ensure guaranteed control actions
under any admissible attack scenario.
Finally, a simulations campaign is provided under several attack scenarios to prove the effectiveness of
the proposed methodology.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
Let us consider the class of Networked Constrained Cyber-Physical System (NC-CPS) described by
the following discrete-time LTI model where we assume w.l.o.g. that the state vector is fully available:
x(t +1) = Ax(t)+Bu(t)+Bddx(t)
y(t) = x(t)+dy(t)
(1)
where t ∈ ZZ+ := {0,1, ...}, x(t) ∈ IRn denotes the plant state, u(t) ∈ IRm the control input, y(t) ∈ IRn
the output state measure and dx(t) ∈ Dx ⊂ IRdx , dy(t) ∈ Dy ⊂ IRn, ∀t ∈ ZZ+, exogenous bounded plant
and measure disturbances, respectively. Moreover (1) is subject to the following state and input set-
membership constraints:
u(t) ∈U, x(t) ∈ X , ∀t ≥ 0, (2)
Definition 1: Let S be a neighborhood of the origin. The closed-loop trajectory of (1)-(2) is said to be
Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness (UUB) in S if for all µ > 0 there exists T (µ)> 0 and u := f (y(t))∈U
such that, for every ‖x(0)‖ ≤ µ, x(t) ∈ S ∀dx(t) ∈Dx, ∀dy(t) ∈Dy, ∀t ≥ T (µ).
Definition 2: A set T ⊆ IRn is Robustly Positively Invariant (RPI) for (1)-(2) if there exists a control
law u := f (y(t))∈U such that, once the closed-loop solution x(t +1) = Ax(t)+B f (y(t))+Bddx enters
inside that set at any given time t0, it remains in it for all future instants, i.e. x(t0) ∈ T → x(t) ∈
Ξ,∀dx(t) ∈Dx, ∀dy(t) ∈Dy, ∀t ≥ t0. ✷
Definition 3: Given the sets A ,E⊂IRn A⊕E := {a+e :a∈ A ,e∈E} is the Minkowski Set Sum and
A∼E := {a ∈ A : a+ e ∈ A , ∀e ∈ E} the Minkowski Set Difference. ✷
A. Set-theoretic receding horizon control scheme (ST-RHC)
In the sequel, the receding horizon control scheme proposed in [1] and based on the philosophy
developed in the seminal paper [2] is summarized.
Given the constrained LTI system (1)-(2), determine a state-feedback u(·) = f (y(·)) ∈U capable i) to
asymptotically stabilize (1) and ii) to drive the state trajectory x(·) ∈ X within a pre-specified region
T 0 in a finite number of steps N regardless of any disturbance realization dx(t) ∈Dx, dy(t) ∈Dy.
The latter can be addressed by resorting to the following receding horizon control strategy:
Off-line -
• Compute a stabilizing state-feedback control law u0(·) = f 0(y(·)) complying with (2) and the
associated RPI region T 0;
• Starting from T 0, determine a sequence of N robust one-step ahead controllable sets T i (see [4]):
T 0 := T
T i := {x∈ X : ∀dx(t) ∈Dx, dy(t) ∈Dy, ∃u ∈U :
A(x+dy(t))+Bu+Bddx(t) ∈ T i−1}
= {x∈ X : ∃u ∈U : Ax+Bu ∈ ˜T i−1}, i = 1, . . . ,N
(3)
where ˜T i−1 := T i−1 ∼ BdDx ∼ ADy.
On-line -
Let x(0) ∈
N⋃
i=0
T i, the command u(t) is obtained as follows:
• Let i(t) := min{i : y(t) ∈ T i}
• If i(t)= 0 then u(t)= f 0(y(t)) else solve the following semi-definite programming (SDP) problem:
u(t) = argminJ j(t)(y(t),u) s.t. (4)
Ax(t)+Bu ∈ ˜T i(t)−1, u ∈U (5)
where J j(t)(y(t),u) is a cost function and j(t) a time-dependent selection index.
Remark 1: It is worth noticing that the cost function J j(t)(y(t),u) can be arbitrarily chosen without
compromising the final objective of the control strategy and, in principle, it may be changed at each
time instant. ✷
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
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Fig. 1. Encrypted NC-CPS over Internet
In the sequel, we consider CPSs whose physical plant is modeled as (1)-(2), while the controller is
spatially distributed and a cyber median is used to build virtual communication channels from the plant to
the controller and vice-versa, see Fig. 1. We assume that sensors-to-controller and controller-to-actuators
communications are executed via Internet by means of encrypted sockets while all the remaining
channels are local and externally not accessible. Moreover, malicious agents have the possibility to
attack the communication over Internet by breaking the protocol security and may compromise/alter
data flows in both the communication channels. Within such a context, two classes of attacks will be
taken into account: a) Denials of Service (DoS) and b) False Data Injections (FDI): DoS attacks prescribe
that attackers prevent the standard sensor and controller data flows, while FDI occurrences give rise to
arbitrary data injection on the relevant system signals, i.e. command inputs and state measurements.
Specifically, we shall model attacks on the actuators as
u˜(t) := uc(t)+ua(t) (6)
where uc(t)∈ IRm is the command input determined by the controller, ua(t)∈ IRm the attacker perturbation
and u˜(t) ∈ IRm the resulting corrupted signal. Similarly, sensor attacks has the following structure:
y˜(t) := y(t)+ ya(t) (7)
where ya(t) ∈ IRn is the attacker signal and y˜(t) ∈ IRn the resulting corrupted measurement.
From now on, the following assumptions are made:
Assumption 1: An encrypted socked between controller and plant can be on-demand reestablished
in at most Tencry time instants.
Assumption 2: The minimum amount of time Tviol required to violate the cryptography algorithm is
not vanishing, i.e Tviol ≥ Tencry.
Assumption 3: No relevant channel delays are due to the communication medium, i.e. all the induced
delays are less than the sampling time Tc.
Remark 2: Assumption 2 relies on the fact that communication channels are not compromised for
at least Tencry time instants downline of a new encrypted socked is established. As a consequence, the
plant-controller structure is guaranteed w.r.t the sensor/actuator data truthfulness. ✷
Then, the problem we want to solve can be stated as follows:
Resilient Control Problem of NC-CPSs subject to cyber attacks (RC-NC-CPS) - Consider the
control architecture of Fig. 1. Given the NC-CPS model (1)-(2) subject to DoS and/or FDI (6)-(7)
attacks , determine
-(P1) An anomaly detector module D capable to discover cyber attack occurrences;
-(P2) A control strategy u(·) = f (y˜(·),D) such that Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness is ensured
and prescribed constraints fulfilled regardless of the presence of any admissible attack scenario.
Moreover, if ua(t) ≡ 0, ya(t) ≡ 0 (attack free scenario) and dx(t), dy(t) ≡ 0 (disturbance free
scenario) ∀t ≥ ¯t then the regulated plant is asymptotically stable.
The RC-NC-CPS problem will be addressed by properly customizing the dual model set-theoretic
control scheme described in Section II-A.
IV. SET-THEORETIC CHARACTERIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF ATTACKS
In this section, an identification attack module will be developed. To this end, the following prelim-
inaries are necessary.
First, notice that according to (4)-(5) the following set-membership conditions hold true:
x(t +1) ∈ Y+(y(t),uc(t))
T i(t)−1 ⊇ Y+(y(t),uc(t)) :={z ∈ IRn: ∃dx ∈Dx, dy∈Dy,
z=Ay(t)+Buc+Bddx +dy} (8)
with Y+(y(t),uc(t)) the expected output prediction set. Then, by using the classification given in [17],
we consider attackers having the following disclosure and disrupt resources:
• Disclosure: An attacker can access to the command inputs u(t) and to the sensor measures y(t);
• Disrupt: An attacker can inject arbitrary vectors ua(t), ya(t) on the actuator and sensor communi-
cation channels but it cannot read and write on the same channel in a single time interval.
Finally, we consider attacks belonging to the following categories:
Definition 4: Let us denote with Ia and Y+a the attacker model knowledge and expected output
prediction set, respectively, then an Attack with full model knowledge is an attack with full information,
I f ull, about the closed-loop dynamics of the physical plant,
Ia ≡ I
f ull:=
{
(1)− (2), f 0,{T i}Ni=0, y(t), opt:(4)−(5)
} (9)
and perfect understanding of the expected output set, Y+a ≡ Y+.
Definition 5: An Attack with partial model knowledge is an attack with partial information, Ia, about
the closed-loop dynamics of (1), e.g.
Ia ⊂ I
f ull and Y+a 6= Y+ (10)
A. Attacks with partial model knowledge
The next result proposition shows that such attacks cannot compromise the system integrity while
remaining stealthy.
Proposition 1: Given the NC-CPS model (1)-(2) subject to cyber attacks modeled as (6) and (7) and
regulated by the state feedback law uc(t) = f (y˜(t)) obtained via the ST-RHC scheme, then a detector
module D, capable to reveal attacks with partial model knowledge, I a ⊂ I f ull, is achieved as the result
of the following set-membership requirement:
y˜(t +1) ∈ Y+ (11)
Proof: Under the attack free scenario hypothesis, the current control action uc(t) guarantees that
the one-step ahead state evolution y+ := Ay˜(t)+Buc(t)+Bddx(t)+dy(t) belongs to Y+ :
y+ ∈ Y+(y˜(t),uc(t)), ∀dx(t) ∈Dx, dy(t) ∈Dy (12)
Since cyber attacks can occur, two operative scenarios can arise at the next time instant t +1 :
(i) y˜(t +1) /∈ Y+, (ii) y˜(t +1) ∈ Y+
If (i) holds true then the attack is instantaneously detected. Otherwise when (ii) takes place, the following
arguments are exploited. First, an attacker could modify the control signal by adding a malicious data
ua(t) and, simultaneously, the detection can be avoided by infecting the effective measurement y(t) as
follows:
Find ya(t) : y(t)+ ya(t) ∈ Y+.
Because the set Y+ is unknown (see Definition 5) such a reasoning is not feasible. A second possible
scenario could consist in injecting small sized perturbations ua(t) and xa(t) such that
Bua(t)+Bddx(t) ∈Dx and xa(t)+dy(t) ∈Dy,
Clearly, in this case by construction the computed command uc(t +1) remains feasible.
B. Attacks with full model knowledge
A simple stealthy attack can be achieved by means of the following steps:
Stealthy Attack algorithm
Knowledge: I f ull
1: Acquire y(t);
2: Estimate the control action uˆc(t) by emulating the optimization (4)-(5);
3: Compute the expected disturbance-free one-step ahead state measurement y¯+ = Ay(t)+Buˆc(t) ∈ Y+a
4: Corrupt uc(t) with an arbitrary malicious admissible signal ua(t) such that uˆc(t)+ ua(t) ∈U
5: Corrupt the output vector y(t + 1), according to expected one-step state evolution y¯+ i.e. ya(t) : y(t + 1)+ ya(t) =: y¯+
6: t ← t + 1, goto Step 1
Note that the above attack can never be identified by the proposed detector D because condition (11)
is always satisfied. As a consequence, the only way to detect it is to increase the information available
at the defender side I f ull so that the partial model knowledgeattack structure is re-considered:
Y+a 6= Y+ (13)
The key idea traces the philosophy behind the watermarking approach [12], where the defender superim-
poses a noise control signal (new information not available at the defender side) in order to authenticate
the physical dynamics. In particular, a watermarking-like behavior can be straightforwardly obtained by
using the ST-RHC property discussed in Remark 1.
Proposition 2: Let (1)-(2) and (6)-(7) be the plant and the FDI attack models, respectively. Let
J = {Jk(y˜(t),u)}N jk=1 , F0 =
{ f 0k (y˜(t))}N jk=1 , N j > 1 (14)
be finite sets of cost functions and stabilizing state-feedback control laws compatible with T 0, respec-
tively. Let j(t) : ZZ+ → [1, . . . ,N j] be a random function. If at each time instant t the command input
uc(t) is obtained as the solution of (4)-(5) with J j(t)(y˜(t),u) and f 0j(t)(y˜(t)) randomly chosen, then the
anomaly detector module (11) is capable to detect complete model knowledge I f ull attacks.
Proof: Because the additional information j(t) is not available to the attacker, then the following
time-varying information flow results:
I f ull(t) :=
{
(1)−(2), f 0,{T i}Ni=0, y˜,opt: (4)−(5), j(t)
}
⊃ I f ull (15)
This implies that Ia ⊂ I f ull(t) and, as a consequence, a perfect stealthy attack is no longer admissible
Y+(y˜(t),uc( j(t))) 6= Y+a (y˜(t),uc(t))
Therefore, the detection rule (11) is effective.
Finally, by collecting the results of Propositions 1-2, a solution to the P1 problem is given by the
following detector module:
Detector(D)(y˜(t)):=
{
attack if y˜(t +1) /∈ Y+
no attack if y˜(t +1) ∈ Y+ (16)
V. CYBER-PHYSICAL COUNTERMEASURES FOR RESILIENT AND SECURE CONTROL
Once a attack has been physically detected, the following cyber countermeasures can be adopted to
recover an attack free scenario:
• Interrupt all the sensor-to-controller and controller-to-actuators communications links;
• Reestablishing new secure encrypted channels.
From a physical point of view, the prescribed actions imply that for an assigned time interval, namely
Tencry, update measurements and control actions are not available at the controller and actuator sides,
respectively. Therefore, the main challenge is:
How we can ensure that, at least, the minimum safety requirements x(t) ∈ X , u(t) ∈U are met while
the communication are interrupted for Tecnry time instants?
The next section will be devoted to answer to this key question.
A. τ-steps feasible sets and associated set-theoretic controller (τ-ST-RHC)
Let T be a RPI region for the plant model (1)-(2) subject to the induced time-delay τ, see [7]. Then,
a family of τ-steps controllable sets, {T i(τ)}Ni=1, can be defined as follows
T 0(τ) := T
T i(τ) :={x∈X : ∃u∈U :
A(k)︷︸︸︷
Ak x+(
B(k)︷ ︸︸ ︷
k−1
∑
j=0
A jB)u⊆ ˜T i−1(τ)
∀ k=1,. . .,τ}
(17)
with {
˜T i1 (τ) = T
i ∼ BdDx ∼ ADy.
˜T ik (τ) =
˜T ik−1(τ)∼A
k−1BdDx∼AkDy, k = 2, . . . ,τ.
(18)
An equivalent description {Ξi(τ)} of (17) can be given in terms of the extended space (x, u) :
Ξi(τ) = {(x, u) ∈ X ×U : A(k)x+B(k)u∈ ˜T i−1(τ),
∀k = 1, . . . ,τ}
=
τ⋂
k=1
{(x, u)∈ X×U : A(k)x+B(k)u∈ ˜T i−1(τ)}
(19)
Hence, the sets of all the admissible state and input vectors are simply determined as follows:
T i(τ) = Pro jxΞi(τ), Ui(K) = Pro juΞi(τ) (20)
where Pro j(·) is the projection operator [4].
Proposition 3: Let the set sequences {Ξi(Tencry)}Ni=1, {Ui(Tencry)}Ni=1, {T i(Tencry)}Ni=1 be given. Un-
der the attack free scenario hypothesis (ua(t) ≡ 0, ya(t) ≡ 0), the control action uc(t), computed by
means of the following convex optimization problem
uc(t) = argmin
u
J j(t)(y(t),u) s.t. (21)
[y(t), u] ∈ Ξi(Tencry), u ∈Ui(Tencry) (22)
and consecutively applied to (1) for Tecnry time instants, ensures: i) constraints fulfillment; ii) state
trajectory confinement, i.e. x(t+k)∈ T i(t)−1(Tencry), ∀k = 1, . . . ,Tencry, regardless of any dx(·)∈Dx and
dy(·) ∈Dy realizations and any cost function J j(t)(y(t),u).
Proof: By construction of (17)-(20), it is always guaranteed that, if x(t) ∈ T i(t)(Tencry), the
optimization (21)-(22) is feasible and an admissible uc(t) there exists. Moreover if for Tencry time
instants the command uc(t) is consecutively applied to (1), one has that
x(t + k)=Akx(t)+
k−1
∑
j=0
(A jB)uc(t)+
k−1
∑
j=0
(A jBd)dx( j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown
, k = 1,. . . ,Tencry
Then in virtue of (17), the disturbance-free evolution x¯(t + k) is
x¯(t + k) ∈ ˜T i−1k (Tencry), ∀k = 1,. . . ,Tencry
and the following implications hold true
∀dx(t + k) ∈Dx,dy(t + k) ∈Dy=⇒x(t + k+1)∈T i−1k (Tencry)
k = 0, . . . ,Tencry−1.
Remark 3: The optimization (21)-(22) is solvable in polynomial time and the required computational
burdens are irrespective of the number of steps Tencry. Further details on the computation of the τ-steps
controllable sets can be found in [4],[10] for comprehensive tutorials and [13],[9] for available toolboxes.
✷
In the sequel, the control strategy arising from the solution of (21)-(22) will be named τ-ST-RHC
controller. Note that it is not able to address all the attack scenarios, because if the more recent action
uc(t) has been corrupted, the Proposition 3 statement becomes no longer valid. In such a case, the
defender can only use a smart actuator module that locally, by means of simple security checks, is able
to understand if the most recent command input is malicious.
B. Pre-Check and Post-Check firewalls modules
In what follows, two complementary modules, hereafter named Pre-Check and Post-Check, are
introduced, see Fig. 1. The reasoning behind them is to passively detect attacks before they could
harm the plant. In particular, such modules are in charge of checking the following state and input
set-membership requirements:
Pre-Check(i(t)):=
{
true if u˜(t) ∈ {Ui(Tencry)}i(t)i=1f alse otherwise (23)
Post-Check(i(t)):=
{
true if y(t)∈{T i(Tencry)}i(t)i=1f alse otherwise (24)
Conditions (23)-(24) check if the received u˜(t) and the measurement y(t) are “coherent” with the
expected set level i(t). If one of these tests fails, then a warning flag is sent to the actuator and an
attack is locally claimed.
In response to the received flag, different actions are performed by the actuator: if the Pre-Check
fails, u˜(t) /∈ {Ui(Tencry)}
i(t)
i=1, then u˜(t) is discarded and the admissible stored input, hereafter named
u−1 := u˜(t − 1), applied; if the Post-Check fails, y(t) /∈ {T i(Tencry)}i(t)i=1, then an harmful command
u˜(t− 1) has been applied bypassing the Pre-Check control. As a consequence, u−1 cannot be used
at the next time instants. In this circumstance, a possible solution consists in applying the zero input
u(t)≡ 0 until safe communications are reestablished. The latter gives rise to the following problem:
How can one ensure that the open-loop system subject to u(t)≡ 0 fulfills the prescribed constraints
(2) and is UUB?
The following developments provide a formal solution.
Let denote with T imax, imax ≤ N the maximum admissible set computed as follows
imax = max
i≤N
i s.t.
AkT i(Tencry)⊕
k−1
∑
j=0
A jBdDx
︸ ︷︷ ︸
first term
⊕ Ak−1BU︸ ︷︷ ︸
second term
∈
min(N,i+Tviol)⋃
j=1
T j(Tencty)
i = 1, . . . , imax, k = 1, . . . ,Tencry.
(25)
Note that the first term represents the autonomous state evolution of (1), whereas the second one takes
care of an unknown input u ∈U. Moreover, the upper bound min(N, imax+Tviol) is complying with the
Assumption 2, where it is supposed that, after the recovery phase, a new attack could only occurs after
Tviol time instants.
The reasoning behind the introduction of T imax concerns with the following feasibility retention
arguments. When data (state measurements and control actions) flows are interrupt the NC-CPS model
(1) evolves in an open-loop fashion under a zero-input action. Therefore the computation (25) guarantees
that, starting from any initial condition belonging to
imax⋃
i=1
(T i(Tencry) the resulting Tencty -step ahead state
predictions of (1) are embedded in the worst case within the DoA
N⋃
i=1
T i(Tencry).
Proposition 4: Let {T i(Tencry)}Ni=1 and T imax(Tencry) be the τ−step ahead controllable set sequence
and the maximum admissible set, respectively. If the plant model (1) is operating under a free attack
scenario and the state evolution x(·) is confined to
imax⋃
i=1
T i(Tencry), then the zero-input state evolution of
(1) will be confined to
N⋃
i=1
T i(Tencry) irrespective of any cyber attack occurrence and disturbance/noise
realizations.
Proof: Constraints fulfillment and UUB trivially follow because 0m ∈U and ⋃min(N,imax+Tviol)i=1 {T i(Tencry)}⊆
X .
C. The RHC algorithm
The above developments allow to write down the following computable scheme.
Actuators Algorithm
Input: u˜(t), Pre-Check, Post-Check
Output: The applied control input u, the expected set-level ˆi
Initialization: ˆi = i(0), u−1 = uc(0)
1: if Pre-Check(ˆi)==true & Post-Check(ˆi)==true then
2: if u˜(t) = /0 then ⊲ Command not received
3: u(t) = u−1; ⊲ Apply previous command
4: else
5: u(t) = u˜(t), ˆi = ˆi− 1; ⊲ estimated set-level update
6: end if
7: else
8: if Pre-Check(ˆi)==false then u(t) = u−1
9: else u(t) = 0; ⊲ Attack locally detected and free-evolution
10: end if
11: end if
12: u−1 ← u(t)
13: t ← t + 1, goto Step 1
τ-ST-RHC Controller Algorithm (Off-line)
Input: Tencry
Output:
{
Ξi
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
T i
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
Ui
}N
i=0 (Tencry), imax
1: Compute a RPI region T 0
2: Compute the families of Tencry−steps controllable sets
{
Ξi
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
Ui
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
T i
}N
i=0 (Tencry) by resorting to
recursion (19) and to the projection (20)
3: Determine the maximum index imax satisfying (25)
4: Collect N j > 1 cost functions (14) and terminal control law f 0j(t)(x˜(t))
τ-ST-RHC Controller Algorithm (On-line)
Input: y˜(t),
{
Ξi
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
T i
}N
i=0 (Tencry),
{
Ui
}N
i=0 (Tencry), Detector(y˜(t)), imax, J
Output: Computed command uc(t)
Initialization: status=no attack, timer=0, encrypted communication channels, initialize Detector, Pre-
Check, Post-Check, Actuator modules
Feasibility start condition: ∃i < (imax +Tviol)≤ N : x(0) ∈
⋃max(N,imax+Tviol)
i=0 {T
i(Tencry)}
1: if status==no attack then ⊲ Start Automa
2: if Detector(x˜(t))==attack then status=attack
3: end if
4: else
5: if status==attack then ⊲ Wait channel encryption
6: if timer< Tencry then timer=timer+1;
7: else
8: Re-initialize all modules; status==no attack; timer=0;
9: end if
10: end if
11: end if ⊲ End Automa
12: if status==no attack then
13: Find i(t) = argmin
i
: y˜(t) ∈ T i(Tencry)
14: Randomly choose the selection index ¯j = j(t);
15: if i(t) == 0 then uc(t) = f 0
¯j (y˜(t))
16: else
17: Compute uc(t) by solving (21)-(22) with cost function J
¯j(y˜(t),u);
18: end if
19: Send uc(t) to the actuators;
20: else
21: Interrupt all the communications
22: Reestablish encrypted communication channels
23: end if
24: t ← t + 1, goto Step 1
Remark 4: It is important to underline that Pre-Check and Post-Check modules need the current
set-level i(t). Unfortunately, this information cannot be transmitted because it could be modified by
some attackers. To overcome such a difficulty, the estimate ˆi(t) provided by the Actuator unit is used.
Note that i(t) and ˆi(t) are synchronized at the initial (t = 0) and at each recovery phase time instants,
while in all the other situations it is ensured that such signals are compatible, i.e. ˆi(t)≥ i(t), ∀t ≥ 0. ✷
Theorem 1: Let {Ξi(Tencry)}Ni=1, {Ui(Tencry)}Ni=1, {T i(Tencry)}Ni=1, be non empty controllable set se-
quences and
x(0) ∈
max(N,imax+Tviol)⋃
i=0
{T i(Tencry)}
Then, the proposed set-theoretic control architecture (τ-ST-RHC Controller, Detector, Pre-Check and
Post-Check) always guarantees constraints satisfaction and Uniformly Ultimate Boundedness for all
admissible attack scenarios and disturbance/noise realizations.
Proof: The proof straightforwardly follows by ensuring that under any admissible attack scenario
the following requirements hold true:
• the on-line optimization problem (21)-(22) is feasible and the state trajectory x(t) is confined to⋃N
i=0{T
i(Tencry)};
• any attack free scenario can be recovered in at most Tencry time instants.
As shown in Section V-B, the worst case scenario arises when the attacker can successful inject
a malicious input that simulates a stealthy attack. First, in virtue of the actions of the Pre-Check
and Actuator modules, the input constraints u(t) ∈ U are always fulfilled. Then, the Post-Check
module ensures that, whenever the state trajectory diverges within the Tencry-steps ahead controllable
set sequence, a recovery procedure starts and an admissible zero-input state evolution takes place, see
Proposition 4.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider the continuous-time model [3][
x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
]
=
[
1 4
0.8 0.5
][
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
+
[
0
1
]
u(t)+
[
1
1
]
dx(t)
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Fig. 2.
{
T i
}60
i=0 (Tencry) family (black polyhedra) and state trajectory (red solid line). Blue arrows point to the current system state vector
at the beginning of each attack scenario.
subject to
|u(t)| ≤ 5, |x1(t)| ≤ 2.5, |x2(t)| ≤ 10, |dx(t)| ≤ 0.05
The continuous time system has been discretized by means of Forward Euler-method with sampling time
Ts = 0.02sec. According to Assumption 1-3, we consider a reliable encrypted communication medium
where Tencry = 4 time steps (0.08sec) and Tviol = 5 time steps (0.1sec).
First, the following polyhedral families of Tencry−steps controllable sets are computed (see Fig. 2):{
Ξi
}60
i=0 (Tencry),
{
Ui
}60
i=0 (Tencry),
{
T i
}60
i=0 (Tencry)
and the maximum safe index set imax = 45 has been determined.
The following simulation scenario is considered:
Starting from the initial condition x(0) = [−1.09, 5.11]T ∈ T 45(Tencry), regulate the state trajectory
to zero regardless of any admissible attack and disturbance realization and satisfy the prescribed
constraints.
In the sequel, the following sequence of attacks is considered:
• Partial model knowledge attacks - (Attack 1) DoS attack on the controller-to-actuator channel;
(Attack 2) DoS attack on the sensor-to-controller channel; (Attack 3) FDI attack on the controller-
to-actuator channel.
• FDI Full model knowledge attacks - (Attack 4). By following the Stealthy Attack Algorithm of
Section IV-B, the attacker, tries to impose the malicious control action
u˜(t) = argmax
u
|Ax+Bu|, s.t.
Ax+Bu ∈ ˜T 0, u ∈U0
with the aim to keep the state trajectory as far as possible from the equilibrium and to avoid the
Post-Check detection by embedding the dynamical plant behavior within the terminal region.
First, it is interesting to underline that the state trajectory is confined within {T i}60i=0 (Tencry) and
asymptotically converges to the origin when an attack free scenario is recovered (t = 4.32sec).
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Fig. 4. State set-membership levels: real plant level i(t) (top figure), Pre-Check and Post-Check estimate level ˆi(t) (bottom figure).
-(Attack 1) Starting from t = 0.14sec, the actuator do not receive new packets. According to the
Actuators algorithm (Step 3) the most recent available command (u(t) = uc(0.12) = 4.95) can be
applied since both Pre-Check and Post-Check conditions are satisfied. At t = 0.16sec, the Detector
identifies the attack (see Fig. 5) because
y˜(0.16)/∈Y +={z ∈ Rn :∃d ∈D,z=Ax˜(0.14)+Buc(0.14)+Bdd}
As prescribed in Steps 4-10 of the τ-ST-RHC algorithm, the existing communications are interrupted and
the procedure to reestablish new encrypted channels started. At t = 0.24sec, the encryption procedure
ends and all the modules re-initialized. It is worth to notice that neither Pre-Check or Post-Check
modules trigger a False Input or False output events. This is due to the fact that the most recent control
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POST-CHECK
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No Attack
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Fig. 5. Detector, Pre-Check and Post-Check flag signals.
action was not corrupted and, by construction, it ensures that the state trajectory remains confined within
the current controllable set for the successive Tencry time instants, see Fig. 4.
-(Attack 2) Starting from t = 0.34sec the Controller does not receive update state measurements and
the Detector triggers an attack event. As a consequence, the network is disconnected and the actuator
does not receive new control actions and the available command u(t) = uc(0.32) = −4.19 is applied,
see Fig. 3. At t = 0.22sec, the attack free scenario is recovered.
-(Attack 3) At t = 0.52sec the attacker injects a signal ua(0.52) = 2 that corrupts the current input
uc(0.52) = −4.91 as indicated in (6). Therefore, the actuator receives u˜(0.52) = −2.91 that is still
admissible as testified by the Pre-Check unit. The main consequence of the latter is that x(0.54)∈ T 20
while the expected set-membership condition should have to be T 18 : the Post-Check module and the
Detector trigger an attack event and the Controller blocks all the communications. From now on, the
Actuator logic imposes a zero-input state evolution, see Step 9. Although during the channel encryption
phase (the encryption procedure ends at t = 0.60sec) the set-membership index increases (see Fig.4),
this does not compromise feasibility retention because x(0.52) ∈ {T i(Tencry)}imaxi=0 and the zero-input
state evolution will remain confined within the domain of attraction, i.e. x(0.60) = [−0.58, 3.61]T ∈
T 42(Tencry), see Fig. 4.
-(Attack 4) At t = 3.84sec, with x(3.83) ∈ T 0(Tencry), an FDI attack corrupts both the communication
channels, see Fig. 2,4.
The attacker is capable to remain stealthy until t = 4.24sec and to manipulate the plant input and
outputs. This unfavorable phenomenon is due to the fact that it is not possible to discriminate between
the attack and the disturbance/noise realizations dx(t) and dy(t), i.e. y˜(t) ∈ Y +,∀t ∈ [3.84, 4.22]sec.
At t = 4.24sec, a different behavior occurs in response to u˜(4.24) =−5.025 /∈U0 with the Pre-Check
module that triggers an anomalous event arising when the attacker tries to impose u˜(4.24) = −4.993
as the current input. Specifically, the attacker determines the estimate uˆc(4.24) and modifies the control
action as follows uˆc(4.24)+ua(4.24)= u˜(4.24). Since a time-varying index is exploited in (21)-(22), the
estimate uˆc(4.24)=−0.032 is numerically different from the effective control action uc(4.24)=−0.059.
Therefore u˜(4.24) /∈U0 and, as a consequence, the attack is detected.
For the interested reader, simulation demos are available at the following two web links: J fixed:
https://goo.gl/8CQ4b8, J random: https://goo.gl/DQhOxB
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a control architecture devoted to detect and mitigate cyber attacks affecting networked
constrained CPS is presented. The resulting control scheme, which takes mainly advantage from set-
theoretic concepts, provides a formal and robust cyber-physical approach against the DoS and FDI
attack classes. Constraints satisfaction and Uniformly Ultimate Boundndeness are formally proved
regardless of any admissible attack scenario occurrence. Finally, the simulation section allows to show
the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed strategy under severe cyber attack scenarios.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Angeli, A. Casavola, G. Franze`, and E. Mosca, “An ellipsoidal off-line MPC scheme for uncertain polytopic discrete-time
systems”, Automatica, Vol. 44, No. 12, pp. 3113–3119, 2008.
[2] D. P. Bertsekas and I. B. Rhodes, “On the minimax reachability of target sets and target tubes”, Automatica, Vol. 7, pp. 233–247,
1971.
[3] F. Blanchini and S. Miani, “Any domain of attraction for a linear constrained system is a tracking domain of attraction”, SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 971–994, 2000.
[4] F. Blanchini and S. Miani, “Set-Theoretic Methods in Control”, Birka¨user, Boston, 2008.
[5] T.M. Chen, “Stuxnet, the real start of cyber walfare?[editor’s note]”. IEEE Network, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 2–3, 2010.
[6] H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada and S. Diggavi, “Secure estimation and control for cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks”. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 59, No. 6, pp. 1454–1467, 2014.
[7] G. Franze`, F. Tedesco and D. Famularo, “Model predictive control for constrained networked systems subject to data losses”,
Automatica, Vol. 54, pp. 272-278, 2015.
[8] S. Gorman, “Electricity grid in US penetrated by spies”, The wall street journal, A1, 2009.
[9] A. A. Kurzhanskiy and P. Varaiya, “Ellipsoidal toolbox (et)”, 45rd IEEE CDC, pp. 1498–1503, 2006.
[10] A. Kurzhanskiı˘ and I. Va´lyi. “Ellipsoidal calculus for estimation and control’, Berlin: Birkhauser, 1997.
[11] F. Miao, M. Pajic and G.J. Pappas, “Stochastic game approach for replay attack detection”, 52nd IEEE CDC, pp. 1854–1859, 2013.
[12] Y. Mo, S. Weerakkody and B. Sinopoli, “Physical authentication of control systems: designing watermarked control inputs to detect
counterfeit sensor outputs”, IEEE Control Systems, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 93–109, 2015.
[13] M. Herceg, M. Kvasnica, C. Jones, M. Morari, “Multi-parametric toolbox 3.0”, European Control Conference (ECC), 2013.
[14] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler and F. Bullo,“Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems”, IEEE Transaction on Automatic
Control Vol. 58 No. 11, pp. 2715-2729, 2013.
[15] T. Samad and A.M. Annaswamy, “The Impact of Control Technology”, IEEE Control Systems Society, 2011.
[16] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg and K.H. Johansson, “Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems’, 50th IEEE Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, pp. 1806–1813, 2012.
[17] A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg and K.H. Johansson, “A secure control framework for resource-limited adversaries“, Automatica,
Vol. 51, pp. 135–148, 2015.
[18] S. Weerakkody, and B. Sinopoli. “Detecting integrity attacks on control systems using a moving target approach”, 54rd CDC, 2015.
